Another way to explain that the value of 0.5 for q i of citrus fruit is not a normatively accurate estimate of causal power is the following. Note that the probabilistic causal power estimate in this case is equivalent to the ratio between the frequency of true cause (e.g., oranges) and the frequency of the broader category (e.g., citrus fruits). 3 It should be clear then that these probabilities are not "invariant properties of relations" (Cheng, 2000, p. 227 ) because they could easily vary (e.g., there is no natural law that constrains the proportion of oranges in citrus fruits). If we travel to a new context in which citrus fruits are common but oranges are rare, the estimated causal power of citrus fruit will change. This test (suggested in Cheng, 2000) indicates that the estimate of the causal power of citrus fruit (i.e., 0.5 in the above illustration) is not context-free and thus an inaccurate estimate of causal power. 4 Thus, this example fails to show that "a probabilistic causal power can be obtained when all of the power PC assumptions are met if candidate cause c is an imperfect hypothesis, even for a reasoner who assumes causal determinism" (Cheng & Novick, 2005, p. 701) . That is, our claim that incorrectly categorized causes violate the no-confounding assumption remains valid.
These difficulties associated with confounds imply that accurate computation of causal power requires a tremendous amount of accurate knowledge, much of which reasoners are unlikely to possess (Cheng & Novick, 2005) . We agree that this poses a problem for accurately judging causal power and that such situations are yet another obstacle to valid causal inferences (including the successful computation of causal power). Indeed, one could argue that "no causal inference should ever occur" (Cheng & Novick, 2005, p. 702) . Therefore, the fact that people are not paralyzed in their causal inferences can actually be taken as evidence against the power PC theory itself (or any other model that requires equally stringent assumptions).
Beyond the problem of confounding, we have also argued that each of the assumptions required to compute causal power is difficult to obtain (Luhmann & Ahn, 2005) . To deal with these difficulties, Cheng and Novick's (2005) reply heavily emphasizes the claim that contextualized causal power (Cheng, 2000) is consistent with the power PC theory. Yet, Cheng and Novick still argue that during causal judgments, one possible goal of reasoners (perhaps a particularly important goal) is to compute causal power. They state, "aiming for causal power and accepting contextual power is as 'contradictory' as aiming for a gold medal and accepting silver" (Cheng & Novick, 2005, p. 703) , implying that causal power (i.e., the gold medal) is the reasoner's ultimate goal. How-1 To illustrate, we refer to the "conjunction of substances in dried orange peel [that] deterministically repels beetles" (Cheng & Novick, 2005, p. 701) as RB. The property RB is confounded with properties of the broader category, citrus rinds. For example, the probability of RB is higher in the presence of leathery, bitter, aromatic rinds than in the absence of these properties.
2 Instead of using Equation 5, q i can be derived as follows. Because P(e|i) ϭ 0.5, P(e|i) ϭ q i ϩ 0.5 ϫ 1 Ϫ q i ϫ 0.5 ϫ 1 ϭ 0.5. Simplifying this expression, q i ϭ 0.0. This value makes sense given that this example is set up such that "some conjunction of substances in dried orange peel deterministically repels beetles, and no other fruit peel . . . has this effect" (Cheng & Novick, 2005, p. 701) . Note that this derivation is only possible from the omniscient perspective in which we already know P(a|i) and the true cause. Reasoners would not have such knowledge, but the derivation is presented simply to further illustrate why the value of q i used in Cheng and Novick (2005) is incorrect.
3 More generally speaking, when causes are inappropriately represented (e.g., true cause is a subset of the candidate cause or the true cause overlaps with the candidate cause), causal power estimates, if calculated as in Cheng and Novick (2005) , will be equivalent to the conditional probability of true cause (i.e., oranges) given the hypothesized causal candidate (i.e., citrus fruits).
4 Again, we are not implying that a reasoner must perform such a test. The fact that the estimated value is neither 0 nor 1 is sufficient to inform the reasoner that some error or errors have taken place even though they might not know the nature of the error(s). The test is presented here from an omniscient perspective to illustrate why this is not a context-free causal power.
ever, people who believe in deterministic causality do not need to compute causal power because they already know that causal power is always either 0 or 1. Cheng and Novick also argue that causal power serves as an ideal. We agree, in the sense that causal power is the "true" value. However, people already know the answer to the ideal.
5 Assuming deterministic causality, any probabilistic causal power estimate suggests incomplete knowledge and the need for further exploration. Returning to the citrus fruit example, reasoners could apply Equation 5, recognize that the resulting estimate conflicted with their belief in deterministic causality (because the estimate is 0.5), and search for possible sources of error. Thus, judgments matching Equation 5 need not imply that people attempt to discover the true value of contextindependent causal power. Instead the results of Equation 5 could be used not in an attempt to discover causal power (because it is already known) but simply as a tool to assess a given situation (but see Cheng, 2000, and Pearl, 2000 , for normative restrictions on such applications). Nor does the use of contextual power imply that, "causal power was evaluated and rejected" (Cheng & Novick, 2005, Footnote 15, p. 705 ). As we suggested in our comment, reasoners could very easily desire contextual causal power from the outset, instead of (not in consolation of) causal power. Cheng and Novick (2005) argue that people's willingness to generalize across contexts contradicts our hypothesis. The claim appears to be that if people are not computing context-free causal power, generalization to new contexts is impossible. Cheng and Novick (2005) argue that previous studies (e.g., Buehner & Cheng, 1997; Buehner, Cheng, & Clifford, 2003; Lober & Shanks, 2000; Perales & Shanks, 2003) demonstrate that participants generalize their estimates to novel contexts. We disagree. In Buehner et al.'s (2003) study, for instance, participants who learned about a medicine that caused headaches were "asked to estimate how many out of 100 people who did not have headaches would have a headache if given the medicine" (p. 1131). But participants were never asked "about a new context (in particular, a counterfactual context in which the alternative causes in the learning context were no longer present)" (Cheng & Novick, 2005, p. 705) , because they were never explicitly told about the absence of alternative causes. Although these people did not have headaches, this does not mean that all alternative causes were absent (e.g., there could have been enabling conditions that interacted with the medicine). In other words, this judgment makes no mention of novel contexts and thus does not require causal learning to be generalized. Therefore, none of these studies can determine if participants "based their judgments on causal power" (Buehner et al., 2003 (Buehner et al., , pp. 1134 
